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Rules which pay are going to stay:
Indigenous institutions, sustainable
resource use and land tenure among the
Ouldeme and Platha, Mandara
Mountains, Northern Cameroon1
Tobias Haller
1 Much has been written in what respect and why Africa does not show good governance.
Some of these studies focusing on the state as the ”Black Man’s Burden” (Davidson B.,
1992), others are pointing at the weak formal institutional aspects, corruption and the
”Politics  of  the  Belly”  (Bayart  J.F.,  1993).  More  challenging  and  interesting  are
nevertheless analysis which argue that “Africa works”, showing how Africa is governed
for example by patron-client-systems. This is not only done by Chabal and Daloz (1999),
but as well  by others,  who are interested in the question of  governance and natural
resource use (see for example Gibson C., 1999). What is lacking however is an analysis
which does not only look at formal institutional aspects (which are missing or not well
established) but which takes up some of the interesting theoretical framework of the New
Institutionalism (North D., 1990, Ensminger J., 1992, 1998, Ostrom E., 1990, Becker D. C.,
and Ostrom E., 1995). In spite of these approaches not being so new anymore and focusing
on economic theories, much insight is to be gained from them when discussing public
services  governing  natural  resource  use.  What  is  especially  interesting  in  these
approaches  is  the  focus  on  so  called  informal  institutions  (rules,  values,  norms,
constraints and customary laws), which have been developed by local groups in order to
regulate for example resources held in private (land) or in common property (pastures,
fisheries, etc.). In absence of the effective working of formal institutions, older informal,
indigenous rules or transformed versions of these "rules of the game”, give local people a
framework for action. The article will illustrate by using the example of the Ouldeme and
Platha, two peasants groups in the Mandara Mountains, Northern Cameroon (Haller T.,
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1999, 2000, 2001) how local indigenous institutions have worked in former times and how
they work now2. It is argued that they are being transformed by a wider national and
international economic system and natural environmental changes (climatic change) as
well as by the interplay with formal institutions. It would be wrong to say that formal
rules (such as formal land law or fishery rights) are not operating at all. They are always a
strategic possibility for actors in order to gain access to resources in a specific process
(see for example the work of Christian Lund (1998)). The article argues that the kind of
institutions being applied to use natural resources (be it formal or informal) depend on
specific situations, in which strategic bargaining power of different actors -local as well as
strangers and administrators- is important. Additionally, it is argued that the operation
and the design of the transformed indigenous institutions are determined whether they
give easy access to financial revenues (especially cash). The hypothesis being discussed
here says that indigenous institutions, which would actually be beneficial for sustainable
resource use but do not give access to cash, are transformed or eradicated, while those
local institutions,  which stay in place,  are mostly being transformed for cash-gaining
purposes. This transformation is important because in the discussion over public services
governing natural  resources,  the question of  local  participation and incorporation of
indigenous rules are crucial.
2 What is  new about  the New Institutionalism and how is  it  able  to contribute to the
discussion of sustainable resource use, indigenous institutions and governance? Different
approaches can be subsumed under this label, where institutions are seen as formal and
informal “rules of the game”, such as constraints, norms, values and rules. These give
incentives for groups and individuals, and also structure human action and interaction,
especially in economic activities,  in collective action and in sustainable resource use.
Institutions such as property rights systems or laws are developed by the state (often
called ”formal” institutions in written form) or by local communities where they are
embedded in their culture (so called “informal” institutions based on orally transmitted
custom) (North D., 1990, Ostrom E., 1990, Ensminger 1992, 1998)3. An important aspect of
explaining how institutions operate is  illustrated by the work of  economists  such as
Douglass North (1990). He not only states that institutions matter for economic activities
(Old  Institutionalism)  but  that  if  institutions  work  properly  they  reduce  what  in
economics is called transaction costs. These are the costs that arise when two people
engage in an economic transaction, which is, as Ronald Coase has shown, costly. To make
a transaction one has to have information about product quality and about the other
actors’  behaviour.  One also has to monitor the other actors and sanction them when
needed. All these activities are costly because they consume time and resources (North D.,
1990). The interesting thing about looking at this theory in analysing the management of
natural resources is the fact that it raises questions about some long held theories. In the
debate on common property resources (CPR) and sustainability for example, the notion of
Garret Hardins famous “Tragedy of the Commons” paradigm (Hardin G.,  1968)4 could
actually be undermined by a close look at how CPR-institutions work. Elinor Ostrom’s
work illustrates this by analysing different CPR institutions and their management by
local  communities  all  over  the  world.  By  looking  at  successfully  operating,  locally
developed institutions that showed sustainable use of natural resources such as forests,
irrigation  water,  fisheries,  pastures,  eight  ‘design  principles’  for  effective  operating
institutions  were  developed.  These  include,  among  others,   the  clear  drawing  of
boundaries  of  resource  territories  and  it’s  users,  collective  choice  arrangements,
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monitoring,  sanctioning  and  conflict-resolution  mechanisms.  So  most  of  them  can
actually be included in the notion of transaction costs. If institutions operate properly
they in fact reduce these costs.  The same aspect we have with the notion of private
property rights or state property – regimes, which were proposed by Hardin and neo-
classical economists to solve the ”Tragedy of the Commons” – if, and only if the lowering
of the transaction costs work. If they do not work because these formalised institutions
are  badly  governed,  they  in  fact  rise  transaction  costs  as  is  shown  in  the  work  of
exponents of the New Institutionalism (Ensminger J., 1997, Ostrom E.,1990 and Acheson J.,
1989).
3 When we have a look at traditional resource use systems and institutions and we see
actual cases of unsustainable resource use, we should spend more time in looking at the
history  of  an  area.  Additionally,  we  should  focus  on  how informal  institutions  have
changed and how formal state institutions intervene or not with local rules of the game.
The destruction of these resources (held in private property) and the changes in local
institutions will be focused on in an example from northern Cameroon. The theoretical
background is the New Institutional Economic Anthropology (Ensminger J., 1992) which
analyses changes in institutions caused by shifts in so-called relative prices. By this term
Ensminger means external influenced changes of prices for goods in relation to other
goods (for example rise in cattle or fish prices compared to other goods). But as well, on a
bigger scale, I would incorporate in this notion changes in the political and economic
environment (pacification, new urban centres and new markets, monetarisation), in state
control (laws, police, administrators), in infrastructure and transport systems (lowering
costs  for  marketing  or  access  by  other  groups)  etc.).  As  a  result  of  these  changes,
endogenous factors in a local society, such as institutions, organisations, ideology and
bargaining power are altered. Institutional changes and changes in bargaining power will
be especially focused on.  Ensminger has shown, that those actors in a society whose
economic situation has been strengthened by the change in relative prices are becoming
more  powerful,  and  have  more  so-called  ‘bargaining  power’  to  transform,  erase,  or
replace institutions with new ones. In line with Douglass North, she illustrates that it is
not the institutions which give the best result for all people involved that are selected,
but the institutions that serve those actors with the most bargaining power (Ensminger J.,
1992, North D., 1990). 
4 The hypothesis I would like to present for discussion is that locally developed institutions
who  were  working  in  former  times  do  not  work  anymore.  They  are  altered  by  the
powerful  and  because  the  monetarising  process  (a  strong  change  in  relative  prices)
changed the institutional setting in a specific way as well. Those traditional institutions,
that can be monetarized will stay in place, while those who are in the way or hinder the
adaptation of the local users to earn cash with these resources – cash which is needed not
only for consumer goods of the globalized world but as well for the building up of social
networks (marriage etc., see also Berry S., 1989, 1993) – will be selected against. I would
like to illustrate this hypothesis by using the example from my own fieldwork in the
Mandara Mountains in Northern Cameroon. 
5
5 The Ouldeme and the Platha are two traditional farming communities with a total of 6700
people who live in an area of 34 km2 belonging to the north-eastern part of the Mandara
mountains adjacent to plain areas in northern Cameroon. In pre-colonial times, they have
turned their territory into an impressive cultural landscape covered with terraces and
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tree parks as many of the so-called Kirdi-groups in the area did. With 191 p/km2 the
territory is densely populated seen the sandy soils and the semi-arid climate. This high
population density without exceeding the carrying capacity of the territory was made
possible with a very intensive traditional agricultural system, making use of terraces,
trees, manure and an intercropping techniques. Important in this system is the constant
repair  of  the  terraces,  which  takes  between  one  fifth  or  one  fourth  of  the  whole
production time on a field. This "agricultural intensification” (an increase in productivity
with a lower working productivity; see Boserup E., 1965) has its roots in the natural and
political environment. To the former – an ecosystem with highly and chaotic variations in
rainfall during the short rainy season – the Ouldeme and Platha adapted by developing a
inter-cropping system and sorghum storing techniques which secured nutrition of the
people even in times of bad harvest. The later consisted in slave-hunting groups in the
plains  such  as  especially  the  Islamic  Mandara  and  Fulbe  as  well  as  their  animistic
neighbours called Mada. The mountain area of the Ouldeme and Platha became a refuge
in which the people had to use the land intensively without any fallow period for there
was no possibility of moving away. Additionally, there were institutional guidelines for
the  use  of  the  soil  and  a  wise  management  of  the  harvest,  which  contributed  to  a
sustainable use. But as can be shown from my data (Haller T., 1999, 2000, 2001), it is not so
easy to return to traditional  institutions for the sustainable use of  natural  resources
nowadays, because they have been altered after many changes in relative prices during
colonial and post-colonial times until now. These institutions have become suboptimal for
economically  rational  individual  actors  under  the  new circumstances  of  pacification,
market incorporation, monetarisation and climatic change. And this despite the fact that
they provided a positive answer to pressing environmental and resource use problems in
the past and still would provide an answer today. The institutions I would like to discuss
here are the prohibition of selling sorghum, reduction of beer production and forced
repair of terraces.
6 Among the Ouldeme and Platha, the sale of the staple crop sorghum was not allowed in
former times. To do so, the people believed would provoke the anger of different spirits
and the soul of the plant sorghum. This would then lead to supernatural sanctions with
the consequence of  bad harvests  and the "leaving of  the grains” from the threshing
grounds and granaries. This institution served well to promote a wise management of
excess sorghum in times of good harvest and also reflected the refugium situation in
which the Ouldeme and Platha found themselves. As they were so dependent from this
crop,  the  worship  of  its  soul  and  the  presence  of  surrounding  spirits  affecting  its
performance was no surprise. I would not argue here, that religion is functional in this
way (meaning that religion is there because it is managing the harvest wisely).  But I
would argue that the animistic religion –being certainly older than the prohibition to sell
sorghum - served well in order to be used as a monitoring and sanctioning device in times
when markets started to develop in the plain areas, which were nevertheless not save yet.
So this institution was lowering transaction costs for storing sorghum for hungry times
while rising the costs for selling the staple crop in an unwise manner for short term
needs with negative long term consequences. Religion served here well because in times
when cash was not important in economic and social life this was not an obstacle for the
household economy but helped to manage the harvest wisely. The interesting thing about
this taboo to sell sorghum is that the rule was not questioned and submission to it was
embedded in an already existing believe of  how souls and spirits act in an animistic
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world. Believing in this ideology or worldview made it easier to sell other goods, when the
markets were opening up even in colonial and the first part of the post-colonial times,
and not touch the staple crop so vital for people’s survival.
7 Another institutional aspect regarded the restricted production of sorghum beer. This
beverage is very important for the Ouldeme and Platha for it is used in many crucial
religious and economic situations during the agricultural cycle. It is one of the modes of
payment in co-operative work for example for threshing sorghum, for house building
(roof work),  acquiring of additional working forces in for weeding fields or repairing
terraces etc. Important is the beer production for marriages during which the female
relatives on side of the groom brew beer for the side of the bride. But most importantly,
beer is needed for religious festivals and for rituals, during which local spirits are feed
with  beer  and  meat.  In  spite  of  beer  being  such  a  valuable  beverage  there  were
institutionalised  limits  for  its  production.  Only  old  men  were  allowed  to  drink,  the
younger men and the women were excluded or had only limited access to beer. This can
be seen as unjust but it had the consequence to limit the beer production. At the same
time beer was not produced for sale. To produce beer, the women were only allowed for
the occasions mentioned above. Interesting in this respect is the fact that by this way the
use of firewood was limited. Because the Ouldeme and Platha women cook with the stalks
of the major plant sorghum, beer production was the only activity where fuel wood was
needed (apart from wood for iron production but which was quite small during the year).
By this way beer production was ruled in former times which as well served well for the
wise management of the harvest and to prevent the unwise use of the staple crop that
was needed in times of bad harvests. It is clear that this animistic religion of the Ouldeme
and the Platha do not have any thing in common with a protestant kind of uneasyness for
festivals and as in any indigenous farmer and peasant society festivals and rituals are
important for several reason. But seen the difficult political situation these people were
in, the institution governing the production of beer ensured that the party goes on from
time to time but under special circumstances only. In this way regulated and embedded in
the animistic believe system, it prevented the excessive use of the harvest. Again here
transaction cost reduction is the positive side of the institution. For the wise long term
use of the harvest and the prevention of excesses, it provided information, monitoring
and as well sanctioning in a face to face community.
8 A third important institutional aspect regards land title issues and maintenance work of
terraced fields: In former times there were rules for repairing terraces. The land tenure
system is based on two major kinds of ownership and user rights in the system of private
property. Because there is much work invested in the terraced fields, they are owned
privately  by  the  head  of  the  household  as  predicted  by  Boserup’s  theory  on
intensification and land rights (Boserup E., 1965) and inherited by all sons in equal shares.
Because this leads to fragmentation of fields into small parcels there is the possibility of
selling and buying land (with the use of special purpose money). But there were rules
regarding the sale: First one had to look for a buyer within the lineage or clan in the own
mountain area section before a field could be sold to an outsider of another section. There
was in the case of need of special purpose money (used as well for paying the bride price)
the possibility to mortgage a field. The usufruct rights over a field was given until the
owner would return the sum given to him by the user of the field. These land use rules
enabled the households with different demographic dynamics to regulate the different
land requirements due to the changing size of their households. Following the theory of
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Alexander Chayanov, the Ouldeme and Platha serve as an example to illustrate his theory
of the consumer-worker-balance.  Although the Ouldeme and Platha do not have land
abundance as in the example Chayanov uses with his Russian material, one can see that
larger  households  with  a  larger  unbalance  of  the  consumer-worker  ratio  (more
consumers as workers and as well bigger households) had to cultivate more land and
work more because they needed this for their subsistence. So the rules for selling and
mortgaging were used in order for the bigger households at a specific time in their family
life cycle to get access to more land. A crucial aspect in the land tenure system was the
maintenance work:  Privately owned fields,  as  well  as  mortgaged fields,  needed to be
constantly repaired because an eroded field would eventually cause severe soil erosion
for the whole territory. The user of a mortgaged field - who had given some amount of
traditional money to the owner in order to get the right to use the field until he gets the
money back - lost his field if he did not repair the terraces on a regular basis. If an owner
himself  neglected  repairing  their  terraces,  the  community  could  sanction  him  for
example with no co-operation in times of need (co-operative work such as threshing etc.)
or exclusion on rituals and other social activities. So here as well the institutional rules
reduced  the  transaction  costs  for  the  secure  transfer  of  land  use  rights  and  of  soil
maintenance  in  the  whole  region  as  they  provided  information,  monitoring  and
sanctioning at low costs.
9 In a transformed form of the original Chayanov model, the individual incentives to stay in
the mountain area and to maintain the institutions presented here can be shown in a
graph  in  which  I  have  introduced  not  only  the  utility  and  drudgery  functions  of
additional work and cultivated land (as used by Chayanov) but the political environment
outside the mountain area as well. Note that this graph is used in order to illustrate the
utility or disutility seen the pre-colonial circumstances as reported to me by old people
and not to give exact calculations which is of course not possible.
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Graph 1: Pre-colonial environmental adaptation of the Ouldeme and Platha based on the changed
model of Chayanov
10 There have been major changes in these institutions since the pre-colonial time. The
most important being the pacification in the plain areas, abolition of slavery and the
introduction of cash for tax payment by the French and the post-colonial government as
well as climatic changes in the 1980ties. As I will show in my paper these changes are
leading to major transformations in the three institutional settings presented above. The
institutionalised rules discussed above no longer operate because the strategies which
were acted against in former times – selling sorghum, producing sorghum beer on a
commercial basis and neglect of terrace repair – have now become very important for
gaining cash. Cash is one of the most important resources in a monetarised socio-political
environment, where marriage, kinship and other social networks are based on monetary
obligations nowadays. The tension to gain cash is extremely high among Ouldeme and
Platha especially after climatic changes made growing cash crops such as cotton and
ground nuts unprofitable. The consequences of these strategies - and the abolishment of
the old institutional rules – is that the granaries are often empty before the end of the
rainy season. Additionally, there are no longer any reserves in times of famine (due to
disasters such as rainfall,  plagues of  crickets  and caterpillars  etc.)  with very obvious
negative consequences. The reason for this is that the old sorghum selling taboo cannot
be  maintained  anymore.  As  there  is  no  income  from  the  cash  crops  anymore  one
substitution strategy is to sell sorghum even if people know that by this they jeopardise
the wise management of their harvests. Unfortunately most of the staple crop is sold
before  a  major  religious  festivals  where  monetary  obligations  for  the  heads  of  the
households are very high (gifts for children, relatives and wives). This leads then to very
low sorghum prices for everybody is selling at the same time. Islamic traders with their
lorries from the nearby cities of Mora and Maroua profit from the low price. They buy
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sorghum in high quantities, store it in the cities and wait until the price has reached
three or four times the initial price. Sometimes the same sorghum is sold again back to
the same farmer. 
11 The second institution, which is abolished, is the rule that sorghum beer is not produced
commercially. As there is no money from the cash crops anymore, from which the women
were given some amount from the men in previous times, producing and selling beer is
the only possible cash substitution. Therefore beer production has more than doubled in
the last 6 to 10 years since my research in the 1990/1ties. This production has led to poor
allocation of scarce sorghum and to abusive logging in the area for firewood, needed for
the commercial beer production. 
12 Another institutional change can be seen in the forced maintenance of terraced fields,
were the old institutions do not work anymore. Today, there are major changes taking
place regarding the land tenure system and the regulation of the land maintenance:
• The users of mortgaged fields are no longer willing to do maintenance work. Good
maintenance improves soil quality and the value of a field and, therefore nowadays, the
price in cash that can be obtained by the owner. He will then take away the well repaired
field form the actual user and give it to a peasant, who pays him more money than the old
mortgaging user. In order to prevent this, terraces in mortgaged fields are not repaired
anymore by the actual users.
• Additionally, there is now a new main form of tenure, where the land is rented on a yearly
basis. This also leads to the neglect of terraces because the time horizon is too short for the
user to invest more work in a field, which he will probably not use in the following year. 
• It is as well very interesting to see that sometimes not only the rented and mortgaged fields
show erosion but as well the fields used by an owner himself. This can be due to the fact that
the owner has lost his working forces (especially sons) and was not able to repair the
terraced fields properly. Sons will leave their fathers today if they are not able to contribute
cash to the bride price. Pacification, free mobility, and market opportunities in the cities
makes migration a viable option in order to obtain cash.
13 So changes in relative prices – especially pacification and free mobility after the abolition
of slavery, monetarisation through tax payment, cash crop production, climate change
and shift from former cash crops to the sale of sorghum -  changed the local bargaining
power of young men and the women compared to the heads of the household. This leads
to institutional changes as the consequence of the adaptation by the individual actors to
the monetarized world.  In  conclusion,  this  can be  summarised as  follows:  The three
traditional institutions (prohibition of sorghum sales, restricted production of beer, and
maintenance of  terraces)  which still  make sense  today,  are  no longer  useful  for  the
individuals in a monetarised world, because they make it difficult to obtain cash. When
discussing why these institutions were working in former times but not today anymore
with local people, they were very clear about the cause: The need to have cash at hand is
of  major importance for social  survival,  something the German Anthropologist  Georg
Elwert has called ”venality” ("Venalität" or Käuflichkeit of social relation ships, see Elwert
G., 1985, 1989). All the discussions regarding social relationships during the time of my
fieldwork were focussing on money. Without cash one could not exist socially for the
social  networks  were  totally  monetarised.  The major  changes  and  utility/disutility
functions can as well be qualitatively shown in graph 2 (by using graph 1 and adapting it
to the changes):
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Graph 2: Changes in relative prices and environmental adaptation among the Ouldeme und Platha
between 1890 und 1990 based on the new Chayanov-Model
U1: pre-colonial time, U2: colonial time, U3 ﬁrst post-colonial time (1960 to 1980) 
D1: marginal disutility between pre-colonial time and 1980, D2: marginal disutility after 1980 (climatic
change)
S: Intersections which show on the  x-axis how big or low the incentive is to keep the institutions
discussed.
14 The graph can be interpreted as  follows regarding to the different  incentives  in the
different times: U1 shows a high utility to stay in the mountain area and to develop and
maintain the three institutions discussed for it made sense in a situation of high hostility
and slave raids. This utility is constantly lowered as pacification and monetarisation is
taking place during colonial and the first pre-colonial time (U2 and U3). On the other
hand the disutility to maintain the institutions discussed is low before and high after the
climatic change. S1-S4 shows the intersection of the curves that indicate the incentive to
maintain the institutions that are positive for a sustainable use of the resources and the
harvest.
15 On the other hand, there are traditional institutions, which still operate because they
could be monetarised and can be used to gain money. To those belong the bride price. I
have made comparisons for pride prices between three generations showing that they
have risen from some goats and special  purpose money which people could produce
themselves in times before and during colonial times up to six times an average peasant’s
salary in the 1990ties. Bride price has risen considerably because it is now one of the
major ways for a household head to gain cash. The buying of gifts for the bride and her
family is nowadays very important as well. The goods, which are demanded, are mostly
industrially produced goods, which can only be obtained by cash payments. Additionally
bride service between young men of a lineage or clan for example on the fields of the
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father of the future bride cannot be made by making reference on reciprocity anymore
but most be paid in cash immediately. Generally, reciprocity institutions inside a lineage
or  kin-group  which  all  stay  in  a  transformed  version  including  massive  monetary
obligations, where everybody seems to know how much another owes him or her.
16 There are various external formal institutional changes worsening the situation as well:
The  state  in  Cameroon  has  outlined  different  land  laws  in  the  past,  which  are
contradictive, favouring the Islamic population in the plains surrounding the Mandara
Mountains (especially the powerful traditional Fulbe and Mandara-chiefs called Lamido).
At the same time, the formal land laws provide no help for the problems with rented and
mortgaged fields in the territory of the Ouldeme and Paltha. 
17 Also, it is very difficult to receive a legal land title by the state due to massive transaction
costs. To get a land title registered, a Ouldeme or Platha peasant would have to pay three
or four times what he earns in a year and what he has paid to the owner for the field. The
transaction costs include the following costs. First, one has to get to the information of
how to apply for a legal title in a far away office. Second, one has to feed and pay a crew
of state officials for the measurement of the field. Thirdly, the registration of the land
title itself is costly and may possibly include a bribe for getting finally the legal title. It is
no surprise that very seldom any Ouldeme or Platha applies for an official  land title
(Haller T., 1999, 2000, 2001). 
18 This  example from a peasant society in Africa shows how some so called "informal"
traditional institutions governing the use of natural resources stay in place, although
altered and transformed. They are adapted to the local changes in relative prices by the
more powerful  in order to have access to cash.  On the other hand,  those traditional
institutions, which do not enable the gaining of cash are erased. They are no longer able
to  play  their  beneficial  former  role  of  reducing  transaction  costs  and  leading  to
sustainable use of natural resources. At the other hand those institutions that do survive,
often in a transformed version, lower the transaction costs in order to have access to
cash : They include norms and values of obligations that can be used easily in order to be
extended in a monetary form. If a pride price is not paid, it is relatively easy to get the
daughter back at the fathers home pushing the future husband and his group to co-
operate. This is due to the fact that larger groups of people are profiting of a bride price
(not only fathers but as well brothers, uncles and mothers) and so more pressure is laid
on the proper price paid. On the other hand it is much more difficult to control the sons,
who are now able to move freely and cannot be controlled in the same way anymore. The
calculation of opportunity costs is for example for the head of a household that it is better
to pay for a high bride price (with the institutional backing and the backing of the local
kin group in order to monitor and sanction it) than to use his authority and keep the
sorghum stored for hungry times. If he does not manage to do this, his sons will leave him
and the terraces will be neglected. One option is therefore to rent an additional field for
one year –where the terraces are not repaired- or to give one’s mortgaged field rented to
a  peasant  repairing  the  terraces  well  to  someone  paying  more,  with  the  same
consequence of lack of terrace-repair. The rules of maintenance and as well the rule of
selling a field to a peasant of one’s mountain section is no longer an option seeing the
high cash which can be gained in short term by abolishing the old institutional land
tenure system. For the women it seems to be the only option to produce beer for cash and
no longer stick to the rule that beer shall only be produced for rituals, marriages and co-
operation work. Women realise that firewood is getting scarce and more expensive and
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that the former wooden savannah in the plains and the adjacent mountain areas is logged
to intensively but in the numerous discussions I had with commercial beer producing
women they could not see any alternative.
19 At the same time formal institutions regarding land rights are not operating properly and
are as well obstacles to better solutions. They in fact rise the transaction cost instead of
lowering them for it is so costly to get a land title and therefore to be rewarded for an
sustainable investment in soil and field improvement.
20 This shall underline the main hypothesis which should of course be tested by the study of
a wider research setting. This is something I am trying to do in the future with a research
project concerning five African floodplain wetlands in Zambia, Botswana, Cameroon, Mali
and Tanzania but this time focusing more on the institutions for the management of
common property resources (fisheries,  wildlife,  pasture and water).  Eight researchers
including myself are in the next four years working in these areas with the same research
design  developed  by  myself  (see  Haller  T.,  2001b,  2002b)6.  The  transformation  of
traditional institutions as well as the eradication of institutions that are unable to adapt
to the monetarized world could provide a research topic for the future also in other
areas. One of the aims should be to investigate transformed institutions, both new and
old.  It should be the aim to highlight the problems and possibilities for local participation
in  the  sustainable  use  of  natural  resources  and  the  discussion  of  how  traditional
institutions could be incorporated in order to be helpful governing and managing natural
resources  in  Africa.  To  my  view the  New Institutionalism challenges  naive  views  of
traditional indigenous institutions and gives insights in how to analyse these rules of the
game.
21 Of course, the idea that local indigenous institutions, which were helpful once, could be
again incorporated or revitalised for governance purposes must be carefully studied. Of
major importance is getting the information of what often not homogenous actors of a
local  group are  striving for  (not  only  gender  and age  related categories  but  as  well
differences  inside these  groups  as  well  as  kinship,  ethnical,  political  and economical
differences). In order to profit from the gains of old institutions, transaction costs should
be lowered and bargaining power has to be levelled by actors from development projects
who are looking for the sustainable use of  natural  resources in participation.  This is
however not an easy task and perhaps not wanted by some of the local actors as well.
Nevertheless, I think that a major step forward lies in the recognition of local resource
rights and a fine tuned support of local user groups securing their resource base and
starting  to  organise  in  order  to  solve  problems.  Much can be  gained  if  we  rise  the
awareness among developers for those processes and encourage them to discuss at length
past and future institutions to govern environmental problems with a local population.
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NOTES
1. APAD-ASC-Conference in Leiden, The Netherlands May 22-25, 2002
2.  In my original paper with the title ”Indigenous institutions and sustainable resource
use: Challenges and insights from the perspective of the New Institutionalism” presented
at the conference I did discuss two further examples as well  (pastoralists in Kenya (Little
P., 1985) and fishers in Mali (Fay C., 1994, 2000)). In these cases similar changes in
institutions can be observed. However for the sake of the uniformity of this APAD
Bulletin, the editors asked me to rewrite the paper and focus on my own fieldwork
material on the Ouldeme and Platha (1990-1991).
3. Of course this dichotomy is based on an economic view. A closer look from legal
anthropology would suggest that one can find some informality in the handling of formal
state institutions, while locally developed rules for example for succession can be very
formalised although not written down. However in this discussion, where the state is an
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important factor I regard the dichotomy as helpful, for on the state level mostly the
written form is the relevant one if the state can govern effectfully.
4.  Hardin states that resources held in common have to be overused because they belong
to nobody and nobody takes care of them. 
5. All data on the Ouldme and Platha can be found im my PhD-publication (Haller T.,
2001) and several articles (Haller T., 1995, 1999, 2000, 2002)
6. Three African PhD students are integrated in a Swiss research program called
"National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North South : Research Partnerships
for Mitigating Syndromes of Global Change". (Underproject IP 6: Institutional Change and
Livelihood Strategies). The NCCR North South is lead by the Centre for Development and
Environment, Department of Geography, University Berne, Switzerland and financed by
the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) and the Swiss Agency for Development and
Cooperation (SDC). My own post-doc research is done in Zambia and is financed by the
SNSF. Two MA-students are doing research in Mali and are financed partly by the
Department of Social Anthropology, University of Zurich and by themselves. There is one
MA-student working in Botswana (co-financed by the Anthropology Department,Zurich
and by himself) and one MA-student working in Northern Cameroon (financed by NCCR,
Anthropology Department and by herself).
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